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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between different types of workplace 
representation and strikes using the 2009 European Company Survey. It also examines 
the role of the workplace climate, union organization, and collective bargaining. Our 
principal finding is that works councils are associated with reduced strike activity. But 
this result is sensitive to the union status of work councilors: where union members make 
up a majority of works councilors any beneficial effect of the entity on strike incidence is 
no longer evident in the data. Not only do union-dominated works councils experience 
greater strike activity than their counterparts with minority union membership, but also 
more strikes than establishments with union workplace representation where union 
members are in a minority. Dissonance between the parties, as indexed by degree of 
divergence between the opinions of employer and employee representative survey 
respondents as to the state of industrial relations at the workplace, is associated with 
elevated strike activity. If our measure of dissonance is exogenous, this result suggests 
that industrial relations quality may be key to strike reduction independent of workplace 
representation. Finally, there is some indication that union density at the workplace is 
directly associated with strike incidence, as well as evidence that strikes are more likely 
when collective bargaining occurs at higher than company level. 
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1. Introduction  
The impact of workplace representation on firm behavior has long been discussed 
in labor economics and industrial relations at both the theoretical and empirical levels 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Godard, 1992; Freeman and Lazear, 1995; Addison, 2009). 
Less discussed are the specific contributions of different types of institutional workplace 
representation such as works councils and joint consultative committees or union bodies. 
Whether it really makes a difference having one type or another, and ultimately whether 
having formal workplace representation matters at all, are the key issues to be examined 
in the present treatment (see also Forth et al., 2017). 
The principal dependent variable considered here is strike incidence. We see 
strikes as an inverse indicator of the potential ability of workplace institutions to generate 
a favorable climate of employee-management relations or trust, an absence of which may 
in turn adversely affect plant-level productivity and financial performance. That strikes 
and the quality of industrial relations have consequences for firm performance have been 
confirmed in various studies (e.g., Kleiner et al., 2002; Krueger and Mas, 2004). But it is 
the determinants of strikes rather than their consequences – which may be smaller because 
of the spillover effects of industrial action – that assume center stage here. Other salient 
features of this inquiry into strikes are union organization, direct measures of the quality 
of industrial relations, the architecture of collective bargaining, nation-state 
idiosyncrasies, and organizational changes within the firm.  
Past studies of strikes have been hampered by small samples of firms, mostly 
pertaining to a single country. Cross-country evidence on union organization and strikes 
is sparse, and that between the institutions of employee workplace representation and 
strikes more so. This parochialism reflects the lack of cross-national datasets or even 
sufficiently comparable national datasets. By contrast with the strikes literature, country 
studies of workplace employee representation and company performance are 
considerably more extensive (e.g., Fairris and Askenazy, 2010), although cross-country 
comparisons are mainly qualitative. Quantitative comparative treatments, although 
certainly more common than in the strikes literature, are still rare. Examples include 
comparisons of Germany and Britain by Addison et al. (2000); of Norway and Britain by 
Bryson and Dale-Olson (2008); and of France and Britain by Bryson et al. (2011). 
The data situation has improved with the availability of large-scale cross-national 
workplace datasets in the form of the European Company Surveys. Specifically, we shall 
use the Management and the Employee Representative Questionnaires of the 2009 
3 
 
European Company Survey (ECS), providing a sample of 30 countries – all the then 27 
EU nations, plus Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey – and 
containing information on approximately 27,000 companies with 10 or more employees 
(see Riedmann et al., 2010).1 
Use of the ECS permits a number of innovations to be introduced into the analysis 
of workplace representation and strikes. In the first place, it allows for a full 
characterization of employee workplace representation, identifying the presence of works 
councils (and analogous bodies such as joint consultative committees) on the one hand 
and union agencies on the other. Second, it permits a distinction to be drawn between 
works councils and union agencies in circumstances where both entities are formally 
present at the workplace. In this light, we shall use the notion of a ‘prevalent’ works 
council or a ‘prevalent’ union agency, based on the identity of the respondent in the 
component Employee Representative Questionnaire. Third, one can further differentiate 
between types of workplace representation using the notion of ‘union domination,’ as 
obtains when a majority of the employee representatives are members of a trade union. 
Fourth, we introduce a dissonance argument capturing a deviation in perceptions between 
the two parties as to the quality of industrial relations at the workplace. Our choice of this 
dissonance measure was designed to eliminate the line of causation in strikes analysis 
running from strikes to the industrial relations quality argument. Fifth, in addition to strike 
incidence, it is possible to construct ordered measures of strike duration, strike frequency, 
and strike intensity. Finally, despite the cross-section nature of the ECS, the data permit 
one to address the potential endogeneity of worker representation. To this end, we shall 
present our baseline model with specifications that initially use an instrumental variables 
approach followed by a multiple treatment effects methodology to tackle selection on 
observables. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a survey of the theory with 
a bearing on worker representation and strikes, as well as a review of the sparse empirical 
literature using the new dataset, to investigate the association between employee 
representation and firm performance/strikes. Section 3 describes the unique dataset. There 
follows in Section 4 a presentation of our two-level mixed-effects ordered logit baseline 
model and robustness procedures. Section 5 reports our detailed empirical findings. 
Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Backdrop to workplace representation and strikes 
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2.1. Theoretical considerations 
The theory of the effects of employee representation is fairly well developed. It 
can be traced to notions of incomplete contracting in which some mechanism has to be 
found to ensure that the parties to a contract that is implicit are motivated to honor its 
necessarily incomplete terms without recourse to constant bargaining/renegotiation with 
all the ensuing possibilities for opportunistic behavior that could dissipate the joint 
surplus of the firm. The literature illustrates how implicit contracts can cope with 
asymmetric information to make truth revelation the appropriate strategy by restricting 
the choices open to the firm while dealing with the enforcement problem through a 
reputation effects mechanism that exacts a stern price in the form of permanently higher 
wages for firms that renege on their promises (see the contributions of Rosen, 1994).  
As initially developed there was no mention of worker representation in contract 
theory. The characterization of the union as a commitment device was first advanced by 
Malcomson (1983) in discussing a situation in which uncertainty in the firm of product 
demand shocks encourages the use of contingent contracts to allocate risk between risk-
averse firms and workers. Yet such contacts are portrayed as unenforceable because 
neither the courts nor the workers can observe the state of the world. Enter the union 
which can provide workers with more accurate information about the state of nature. 
Coordinated action by the union permits workers to enforce an efficient, state contingent 
contract.   
In sum, a prima facie case came to be made that worker representation can 
facilitate efficient contracts in situations where there is a long-term relation between the 
two sides but where employers’ ex ante promises to take workers’ interests into account 
are not credible or where the reputation effects mechanism offered by the market is weak. 
Interestingly in the light of what follows in the discussion of rent seeking, the union role 
in contract theory was most commonly invoked in the context of worker investments in 
firm-specific training, where firms might ‘hold-up’ workers by appropriating their share 
of the quasi-rents rents resulting from these investments.  
However, the key theoretical construct in examining the union role is provided by 
the model of collective voice. As developed by Freeman and Medoff (1984), collective 
voice has a number of distinct components. Of these, the best known is the union role in 
providing information. The labor market context is important here. It is largely one of 
continuity rather than spot market contracting because of the on-the-job skills specific to 
the firm and the costs attaching to worker mobility and turnover.  What mechanisms are 
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available to elicit information on worker preferences and sources of discontent in these 
circumstances? It is argued that given the public goods nature of the workplace, collective 
voice provided by the union outperforms individual voice (obtained either inferentially 
or directly via exit interviews). Unions collect information about the preferences of all 
workers and aggregate them to determine the social demand for such public goods.  The 
expression of collective voice is expected to reduce quits and in turn by lowering hiring 
and training costs increase investments in firm-specific human capital.  Lower quits may 
also occasion less disruption in the functioning of work groups.  
In addition to information provision, the other main aspect of collective voice is 
governance.  Freeman and Medoff (1984: 11) argue that this function is quite consistent 
with the contract-theoretic literature reviewed earlier. They contend that the response of 
a union specializing in information about the contract can prevent employers from 
engaging in opportunistic behavior. Workers may withhold effort and cooperation when 
the employer cannot credibly commit to take their interests into account. Fearing 
dismissal, they may be unwilling to invest in firm specific skills or disclose information 
facilitating pro-productive innovation at the workplace. The formation of a union and the 
introduction of a system of industrial jurisprudence is one means of protecting employees. 
In this way unions may generate worker cooperation, including the introduction of 
efficiency enhancing work practices. However, the threat of credible punishment implies 
bargaining power and in turn implies rent seeking behavior on the part of the union. 
Subsequent development of the union voice model sought to accommodate the 
bargaining power problem. Before turning to this issue, however, we need to address the 
theme of dissatisfaction, and the strikes variable more directly.  In discussing the 
reduction of quits the expression of voice in the collective voice model appears to 
emphasize dissatisfaction; that is, voice is described as directing attention to workplace 
problems, encouraging expressions of discontent, and keeping dissatisfied workers from 
quitting (Freeman, 1976: 367), even at the same time as good industrial relations are 
viewed in the model as key to improved productivity (Freeman and Medoff, 1984: 165).  
Furthermore, expressed worker dissatisfaction is recognized to be higher in union regimes 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984: Chapter 12). Against this backdrop, modern empirical 
research has suggested that employee satisfaction and well-being have an important role 
in determining establishment productivity (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2012), a 
relationship that is also reported in lab experiments linking human happiness and human 
productivity (Oswald et al., 2015). Vulgo: Might not voice be more pro-productive if it 
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came from more satisfied workers?2 Two responses may be made to this criticism. First, 
the architects of collective voice interpret the difference in expressed complaints between 
union and nonunion labor as an expression of democracy rather than as indicative of a 
true shortfall in satisfaction, the difference between ‘true’ and ‘voiced’ dissatisfaction 
reflecting the nature of the voice institution (Freeman and Medoff, 1984: 139). Second, 
other recent research has suggested that when one controls for the endogenous selection 
induced by the sorting of workers into unionized jobs, the material difference in job 
satisfaction between unionized and non-unionized workers no longer obtains or is much 
reduced (see Laroche, 2016, and the references contained therein). In short, a selection 
effect rather than a causal effect may characterize the relationship between union 
membership and dissatisfaction. Rather than dissatisfaction, distributional conflict (and 
mutual perceptions of the relationship between the two sides) may be the more relevant 
consideration(s).3 
Next we need to briefly address strikes more explicitly. First, the presence of trade 
unions is often viewed as a prerequisite for strikes and there is a well-documented 
association between union organization and strike incidence, that is, between a capacity 
to strike and unions (e.g., Kaufman, 1982). There is nothing in the above to counter the 
notion that union organization or resource mobilization are relevant to strike incidence. 
Second, the exit-voice model ultimately hinges on the importance of good industrial 
relations.4 This recognition finds a ready counterpart in the (macro) performance model 
of Blanchard and Philippon (2004) in which it is argued that the more unions and firms 
share a common economic model, or the more that they discuss the economic implications 
of different shocks, the faster learning and adjustment are likely to be. Bayesian learning 
is thus central to this model in which the effect of shocks on unemployment depends 
largely on whether and how fast they are perceived by unions. Blanchard and Philippon 
proxy industrial relations quality by strike intensity and report that countries with one 
standard deviation better quality had about 1 percentage point lower unemployment than 
the average OECD country in 1965-74 improving to some 2-2.5 percentage points less in 
1985-2002.  Accordingly, it may be argued that union regimes to the extent that are also 
characterized by good industrial relations should record lower strike activity. Blanchard 
and Philippon’s reasoning is clearly consistent with distinct strike models that interpret 
withdrawals of labor as bargaining mistakes (e.g., Siebert and Addison, 1981).   
 Returning to the theme of bargaining power, subsequent development of the 
collective voice model has sought to accommodate rent seeking behavior. We refer to 
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Freeman and Lazear’s (1995) purpose-built analysis of employee workplace 
representation; specifically, the works council and its codetermination or joint-
governance power at the workplace. Freeman and Lazear argue that codetermination will 
be underprovided by the market because an institution that gives power to workers will 
affect the distribution as well as the size of the joint surplus.5 Some limits have therefore 
to be placed on the bargaining power/potential rent seeking ability of works councils and 
for these authors the German institution fits the bill.  
 The content of collective voice is elaborated in this works council model. 
Workplace representation is seen as a continuum, ranging from information exchange 
through consultation to participation. Works councils with rights to information reduce 
economic inefficiencies by moderating worker demands in difficult economic 
circumstances. Thus, management’s use of the works council as a communicator to 
workers about the state of nature can lead them to work harder in adverse states, whereas 
in the absence of credible information – equated with the requirement to disclose financial 
information – workers might be tempted to reduce the pace of work/withdraw labor. For 
their part, consultation rights can produce new solutions to the problems confronting the 
firm, by virtue of the non-overlapping information sets of the two sides and the creativity 
of discussion. Finally, participation rights offer the prospect of an improvement in the 
joint surplus by providing workers with enhanced job security that encourages them to 
take a longer-run view of the prospects of the firm.  Otherwise, fearing dismissal, they 
may be unwilling to disclose information essential to innovation at the workplace. 
These are the advantages. However, the same factors that cause the surplus to 
grow in the model also cause profitability to fall. Workers are depicted as demanding too 
much involvement because their share in the surplus continues to rise after the joint 
surplus is maximized, so that it is in turn logical for employers to resist works councils or 
vest them with little power. (There is also the issue of the direct and indirect costs 
associated with the functioning of a worker representation body.)  Accordingly, some 
type of third-party regulation limiting bargaining power has to be found if the societal 
benefits of worker voice are to be realized. It is conjectured that a German-style system 
might allow a decoupling of the factors that determine the size of the joint surplus from 
those that determine its distribution. But of course the German system with its checks and 
balances is but one of many worker representation types, while within that country, as in 
other nations, works councils are not a datum (see, for example, Kotthoff, 1981; Jirjahn 
et al., 2011). 
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Nevertheless, although still open ended, the works council model is suggestive of 
a potentially more positive role for this institution than for analogous union bodies. 
Observe however that any assessment of this institution is not independent of unionism 
and other factors. For its part unionism is causally linked to strikes because unions have 
the often unique capacity to strike. Yet if it is union power that is the issue then, mistakes 
aside, unions should mostly achieve their goals without the need to strike, management 
recognition of that power leading to concessions and settlements.6 However, to the extent 
that unions are not generally viewed as integrative bargaining institutions, there are 
grounds for expecting a positive relation between union density and strikes on enhanced 
capacity to strike grounds. Similarly, where the information and consultation body has 
strong links with unions at workplace level, the deliberative function of workplace 
representation may be attenuated as the distributive role is elevated. Moreover, 
multiunionism causes especial problems. Not only has it been linked to poor performance 
(e.g., Metcalf, 2003) but there is also a distinct literature linking multiunionism to higher 
strike activity (e.g., Akkerman, 2008).7  
  With respect to collective bargaining, there is a presumption in the economics 
literature in favor of company agreements, at least insofar as firm performance is 
concerned (e.g., Jimeno and Thomas, 2013). On the basis of that literature, and assuming 
that strikes do indeed have negative implications for productivity and profitability, the 
suggestion is that strikes will be higher when bargaining is conducted at levels higher 
than firm or company level. On the other hand, companies bound by a collective 
agreement reached at sectoral or branch-level may well experience fewer frictions 
between management and the workplace representative body precisely because 
distributional conflicts regarding the terms and condition of employment have already 
been resolved. This suggested pro-productive symbiotic relationship is most often 
encountered in the German case given its dual system of industrial relations (e.g., Hübler 
and Jirjahn, 2003; Addison et al., 2016), but even in that country the evidence is mixed. 
This result is to be expected pending investigation of the links between unions and works 
councils at workplace level.  
Next, from the perspective of Pareto optimal accident models of strikes (see 
Siebert and Addison, 1981), we have also to consider the impact of changing workplace 
conditions. Our premise would be that the greater the change in working conditions, the 
greater the scope for mistakes and the higher strike incidence. Other arguments that may 
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be traced to the accident model include firm size and non-independent units, reflecting 
workplace and institutional complexity, respectively. 
Finally, and now directly linked to the collective voice (institutional response) 
model, is the importance of a good working relationship between management and 
worker representatives, even if this is not guaranteed by the presence of workplace 
representation. Indeed, as we have seen the architects of collective voice see the manner 
in which the two sides interact as more central to performance than the worker voice 
instrument itself (Freeman and Medoff, 1984: 179). 
 
2.2. A partial review of the ECS literature 
The extant literature using the ECS is sparse and only one such study is formally 
devoted to the strikes issue. The other studies look at either economic performance or 
behavioral indicators other than strikes. Nevertheless, each informs the present treatment 
of strikes. At the outset we note that almost all studies are confined to a single cross 
section – the 2009 ECS – reflecting the difficulty of integrating the component manager 
and employee representative surveys in the case of the 2013 ECS, as was alluded to 
earlier.8 
The first of two studies selected for review here is by Forth et al. (2017). It is 
notable in clearly distinguishing between trade union and works council representation at 
the workplace, as well as situations in which both agencies are jointly present. (Forth et 
al. also identify whether union or works council representatives were prioritized when 
seeking an employee representative, although unlike the present treatment they do not use 
this information in their subsequent analysis.) Most of the authors’ investigation is given 
over to explaining the incidence of workplace representation across the European Union, 
although our focus here will be upon that part of their analysis investigating the 
association between the presence of union and works council representation and 
behavioral outcomes.9  
Specifically, three binary behavioral outcomes derived from the management 
interview are examined: the climate of industrial relations as either ‘quite strained’ or 
‘very strained;’ problems of low motivation among workers; and problems with staff 
retention. The authors regress their three binary indicators on trade union/works council 
representation and a full set of workplace characteristics. In a first specification, they 
consider the contribution of a simple presence of any trade union or works council 
representation as opposed to no workplace representation. In a second specification, they 
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replace this overarching measure with three categorical indicators, namely trade union 
representation only, works council representation only, and the presence of both union 
and works council representation.  The result of the former exercise is that the presence 
of either form of representation is associated with a greater probability of observing a 
strained work climate, although workplace representation plays no role in influencing 
motivation or staff retention. Turning to the second specification, only the dual channel 
regressor is statistically significant; that is, workplaces with both works council and trade 
union representation are again more likely than workplaces without representation to have 
a strained climate but on this occasion less likely to report problems with staff retention. 
Forth et al. therefore conclude that only modest support can be adduced from this finding 
for (a British variant of the) exit-voice model. 
Of the studies using the 2009 ECS, only Jansen (2014) examines strike incidence, 
and his focus is more upon various union organization arguments than workplace 
employee representation bodies per se. In fact, Jansen does not consider differences in 
types of worker representation in a single country, referring to all such bodies as “works 
councils.” But given his emphasis on union organization factors (and the organizational 
power of unions in particular), Jansen not only considers the company’s union 
membership rate but also the presence of multiunionism and union domination of works 
councils (circumstances in which a majority of works councilors are union members). 
Moreover, drawing on separate, non-ECS indicators, he also considers the effect of cross-
national differences in overall union density, in the number of union confederations, and 
in union decentralization (defined as the inverse of the authority unions have over their 
local branches), together with their cross-level interactions first with the union 
membership rate, then with multiunionism, and finally with union-dominated works 
councils. It is hypothesized inter alia that, by reason of greater organizational resources, 
higher union density should be associated with higher strike incidence at company (and 
national) level, and that decentralization should have weakened the positive association 
between union density and strikes at national level. 
Abstracting here from differences in national trade unions systems – other than to 
note the findings that density, number of confederations, and degree of decentralization 
are found to independently increase strike activity – and focusing therefore upon his 
analysis of company-level effects, Jansen reports that the likelihood of a strike is some 
1.4 times greater where a collective agreement is negotiated at higher than company level. 
For their part, the proportion of union members in the workforce, multiunionism, and 
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union penetration of the ‘works council’ are all positively related with strike incidence. 
For example, companies in which trade union members make up more than one-half of 
the local works council are 1.3 times more likely to confront a strike than their 
counterparts where there is no union majority. Interestingly, however, there is no 
suggestion that multiunionism weakens the organizational capacity of union-dominated 
works councils.  
The strength of the Jansen study resides in its formulation of concrete hypotheses 
regarding the associations between different types of union organization and strikes at 
company level and to recognize potential differences in national union systems in this 
regard, including the cross-level ‘effects’ of national indicators. Each issue will be 
addressed in what follows. Despite the insight offered by the notion of a union-dominated 
works council, however, it is clear that the works council argument itself is an aggregate 
of different types of formal workplace representation, including union agencies in 
addition to works councils proper. Furthermore, issues of endogeneity are neglected. 
 
3. Data  
This study uses the 2009 European Company Survey (ECS), the original file 
having been downloaded from the U.K. Data Service site at 
https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/.  As mentioned earlier, it includes all EU-27 countries, 
plus Croatia (which joined the EU in 2013), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
and Turkey. The survey is conducted in two stages: the first is an interview with a senior 
manager, while the second comprises a shorter interview with an employee representative 
in only those establishments with an employee representation body. These two 
components are referred to as the Management (MM) Questionnaire and the Employee 
Representative (ER) Questionnaire. The latter constitutes a necessarily smaller sample, 
as an establishment may not have any workplace representation entity (or, even if an 
employee representative body – formal or informal – is present, the ER questionnaire may 
be missing either because the employee representative declines to answer or the manager 
respondent fails to provide the proper employee representative contact information). 
Thus, out of 27,160 establishments in the 2009 MM survey, no less than 13,708 (or 50.5 
percent) reported an absence of any employee representation at the establishment level. 
Of those reporting an employee representative body, 6,569 units (or 47.9 percent) 
furnished a valid response to the ER questionnaire.10  
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Beginning with the MM questionnaire, the very first step consists of generating a 
proper employee representation code that maps institutions to establishments across 
countries. Given national idiosyncrasies, this is a critical aspect of our inquiry, as different 
assignment rules produce different employee representation types. Our initial procedure 
was therefore to generate a 1/0 dummy, taking the value of 1 if formal employee 
representation is practiced at the establishment, 0 otherwise. By formal employee 
representation is meant the presence of a trade union entity per se or a work council type 
of representation. Thus, in the case of the United Kingdom, for example, formal 
representation requires that there is some recognized shop floor trade union 
representation or a joint consultative committee. For its part, any ad hoc form of worker 
representation is classified as informal; one example being a Delegado de Personal in 
Spain. By definition, such entities do not constitute formal employee representation.11 
A complete mapping of formal employee representation by country is given in 
Table A.1, which also documents further coding details, including the full reference to 
the original (raw) variables. Observe that in countries such as France and Italy, 
establishments are permitted to have a trade union or a works council-type agency, or 
both, whereas in Germany (Sweden) only a works council (trade union) representation is 
allowed. For countries in the former group it is possible to assign mutually exclusive 
worker representation agencies. This is obvious enough for establishments having only 
one type of representative body in situ even if both are possible – here the situation is no 
different in practice from the case in which only one type of representation is allowed. 
However, what of establishments with two institutions present but, as is always the case, 
only one worker representative is interviewed? All that is required in this case is 
information on the type of respondent. Our presumption is that if the person interviewed 
is a works councilor, then the works council may be assumed to be the leading institution. 
Conversely, if the respondent is a member of the trade union agency, then the union body 
can be thought of as the principal entity. We can therefore speak of mutually exclusive 
situations in which the works council or the union body is the prevalent form of worker 
representation, such that a prevalent works council refers to situations in which there is 
either a unique works council at the workplace or where the works council agency can be 
adjudged more influential than the corresponding union agency where both entities are 
present; and mutatis mutandis for a prevalent union. A prevalent works council and a 
prevalent union are then the selected categories in our regression analysis in Section 5, 
below. 
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By design, the questions in the MM and ER component surveys are separate with 
almost no overlap. In particular, the employee representation information is extracted 
from the MM dataset, while the information regarding employee organization at the 
workplace is exclusively based on the ER dataset. Matching is therefore immediate for 
the 2009 ECS, as the variables are provided in a single dataset with a unique establishment 
identifier.  
The list of variables extracted from the MM and ER datasets is described in Table 
A.2. Beginning with the former survey, in addition to employee representation status, the 
variables include establishment size (given by the number of employees in 10 intervals), 
industry affiliation (11 groups), whether the establishment is an independent unit as 
opposed to being part of a multi-establishment organization, and whether it is in the public 
sector. In addition to these establishment characteristics, we deploy information on the 
type of collective wage agreement (4 categories, including no agreement) and measures 
of organizational change (4 types). A final subset of variables from the 2009 MM exploits 
information on the manager respondents’ assessments of the quality of industrial relations 
at establishment level.   
From the 2009 ER survey we (initially) extract three variables related to union 
organization, namely the number of unions represented at the establishment, union 
density at the establishment, and union membership of the employee representation body. 
Using the last argument, we generate a dichotomous variable that flags whether the 
employee representation entity is union dominated (set equal to 1 if trade union 
membership exceeds 50 percent). Accordingly, we can identify a union-dominated union 
agency, a union-dominated works council, or a worker representative entity of either type 
that does not have a union majority among its members (i.e., is nonunion-dominated), 
making up four possible cases. Observe that even if the workplace representation vehicle 
is designated as exclusively a union agency it does not necessarily follow that the majority 
of the employee representatives are trade union members.  
A final subset of variables taken from the ER survey is drawn from the employee 
respondents’ views of the state of industrial relations at the workplace. These are then 
used in conjunction with the corresponding question taken from the MM survey, to form 
a measure of disagreement/dissonance between the two parties as to the ruling state of 
industrial relations at the workplace. After experimentation, we constructed two 
dichotomous variables designed to reflect sharply divergent views of the parties, with 
either management claiming the industrial relations situation was very good/good and the 
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employee representative arguing to the contrary that it was hostile, or vice versa. The two 
variables are labeled Deviation/Dissonance_1 and Deviation/Dissonance_2, respectively, 
as described in Table A.2. Agreement between the parties to the effect that the work 
climate is unambiguously favorable provided the reference category. 
Finally, we turn to our crucial strike variable. In the 2009 ECS, the ER survey 
inquires of respondents whether or not there have been (a) one or (b) more instances of 
industrial action in their establishments in the last 12 months and, in each case, whether 
the incident consisted of (i) a stoppage of work or strike of less than one day, (ii) a strike 
of one day or more, (iii) a refusal to work overtime, or (iv) some other actions. To simplify 
the notation let us flag (a) and (b) as _a and _b, and (i), through (iv) as _1, through _4, 
respectively. We have therefore the following two disjoint subsets, {(_a, _1), (_a, _2), 
(_a, _3), (_a, _4)} and {(_b, _1), (_b, _2), (_b, _3), (_b, _4)}. 
Based on these two subsets, one fairly obvious construct that has found favor is 
to generate a strike incidence dummy that simply flags the existence (or otherwise) of a 
‘stoppage or strike,’ irrespective of its duration (which in the case of stoppages is 
necessarily less than one day) and irrespective of its frequency (i.e. one or more than one 
instance). Accordingly, the generated strike incidence dummy is set equal to 1 whenever 
the respondent reports at least one of the following combinations (_a, _1), (_a, _2), (_b, 
_1) or (_b, _2). This will be our first and principal outcome measure, namely strike 
incidence.12 
Given the structure of the questionnaire, one can also construct some alternative 
ordering of the strike events observed at the workplace. Although it is not possible to 
construct a continuous measure of strike intensity, frequency, or duration, one can in 
practice arrive at three informative indicators. In the absence of consensus in the strikes 
literature as to which strike measure to use as the dependent variable (see Stern, 1978), 
including disputation on whether strike incidence and strike duration display the same 
cyclical pattern (see Crampton and Tracy, 2003), we deploy these three additional strike 
measures to determine whether there is anything distinctive in the results for incidence. 
A full description of the procedures used in their construction is provided in the Appendix.  
 
4. Modeling       
In our regressions strike incidence is explained by specifying a two-level mixed-
effects logistic model as follows: 
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1| 𝑋1𝑖𝑗, 𝑋2𝑖𝑗, 𝑢𝑗  ) = 𝐻(𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑋1𝑖𝑗 + 𝐵2𝑋2𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗)                        (1) 
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where 𝐻(. ) is the logistic cumulative distribution function and establishment 𝑖 is nested 
in group (country) j, with 𝑖, = 1, 2, … , 𝐼, and 𝑗 = 1, 2, … 𝐽. 𝑦𝑖𝑗 is the selected 1/0 outcome 
indicator. Omitting the establishment and country subscripts, 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 denote a vector 
of establishment- and country-specific characteristics, respectively; in particular, 𝑋1 
includes establishment size, industry affiliation, and type of workplace employee 
representation inter al., while 𝑋2 may include any characteristic that is common to all 
entities in a given country. 𝑢𝑗  denotes a set of random intercepts.  The two-level mixed-
effects logistic model is implemented using the melogit command in Stata 15.0, and, to 
simplify the interpretation of the results, we will only report the corresponding marginal 
effects, obtained by fixing the random effects at their theoretical mean (i.e. zero) and all 
control variables at their sample mean. 
One possible extension of equation (1) is to allow for a random slope of, say, 
establishment characteristic 𝑥1𝑘, in which case the model becomes: 
     Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1| 𝑋1𝑖𝑗, 𝑋2𝑖𝑗, 𝑢0𝑗  ) = 𝐻(𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑋1𝑖𝑗 + 𝐵2𝑋2𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗 ∗ 𝑥1𝑘𝑖𝑗 )      (2)                 
In particular, as shown in Section 5 below, we will check the sensitivity of our results to 
the introduction of a random slope for the public sector and union density arguments. 
Given the general specification in models (1) and (2), some further clarifications 
are in order. In the first place, as was implicit in our earlier remarks, a distinctive technical 
component of our modeling strategy has been the construction of outcome measures 
additional to strike occurrence. That is, we shall subsequently replace the strike incidence 
dummy in models (1) and (2) with a measure of strike intensity (and duration and 
frequency). This in turn involves the use of a two-level mixed-effects ordered logit, with 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 now flagging a categorical and ordered variable. In the case of strike frequency, for 
example, 1, 2, 3 may denote ‘no strikes,’ ‘one strike,’ and ‘more than one strike,’ 
respectively. 
Secondly, we experiment with different comparison groups. For example, once 
we draw a distinction between formal and informal worker representation, it is possible 
to contrast ‘absence’ of worker representation with any type of formal worker 
representation. All that is required in this case is simply to equate this ‘absence’ with the 
presence of ‘informal’ worker representation. The point here is that even if the presence 
of an informal body is small in percentage terms (2 to 3 percent, as shown in Table 1 by 
subtracting column (4) from column (5)), it is sufficiently sizable to gauge the likely 
impact of having no (formal) workplace representation at all.  
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Thirdly, it will be recalled that by being able to identify the worker representative 
interviewee, it is possible in practice to establish the prevalent type of formal workplace 
representation at establishment level. This key aspect allows us not only to uniquely 
contrast works council with union entities but also, as was noted above, to compare the 
presence of formal workplace representation with its absence. 
Fourth, we use deviation from agreed best-practice workplace labor relations – 
where mutual agreement on there being good labor relations is the reference category – 
to proxy the quality of industrial relations. The hypothesis is that difference between the 
two sides as to the state of workplace relations are aspects of ‘dissonance’ which we 
regard as a symptom of less cooperative industrial relations at establishment level, likely 
reflected in a higher level of contestation. The measure may also reflect trust and 
asymmetric information if, as Blanchard and Philippon (2004) surmise, the quality of the 
dialogue between the two sides captures the speed of learning of labor. While we are 
reluctant to accept that lagged strikes provide an instrument for trust, we would observe 
that our dissonance measure has the related advantage of reducing endogeneity bias 
arising from the use of a one-sided or unilateral measure of quality. 
Finally, we address the possible endogeneity of workplace employee 
representation. As a first step, we ignore union dominance of the workplace 
representation body and instrument works council/union representation status. The 
selected instrument is a 1/0 dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there exists any 
performance-related elements of pay for staff other than top management. The variable is 
presumed to be correlated with the works council/union representation, but not with the 
selected outcome (strike incidence).  
Our use of performance-related pay as an instrument for works councils has a 
basis in our earlier theoretical remarks. To the extent that the pay practices in question 
are of a traditional (individual) payment-by-results type, their workplace setting is the 
reverse of that envisaged under implicit contract theory/governance models and the 
collective voice mechanism. Further, to the extent that works councils are the ultimate 
institutional vehicle of collective voice – beyond union representation per se – then the 
implication is that traditional individual payment-by-results schemes will not only be less 
practiced in prevalent works council regimes than in workplaces without worker 
representation but also in those with prevalent union workplace representation. (It is 
recognized that unions have historically opposed payment be results but the relevant 
issues here are, firstly, the backdrop of the integrative as opposed to distributive nature 
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of bargaining under works councils and, secondly, the effect of union decline on the 
ability to oppose payment by results.) Of course, if performance related pay instead takes 
on the less traditional form of a high performance work practice, then the latter may either 
complement or substitute for workplace representation of either type.13  
Turning to the exclusion restriction, we anticipate no differential effect of 
conventional payment-by-results on strike incidence. Note that the issue here is not one 
of whether payment-by-results occasion more work stoppages – associated, say, with the 
periodic renegotiation of the piece rate – but rather one of whether there is any 
incremental effect of payment-by-results on strike incidence in prevalent works council 
regimes beyond that contributed by the differential (i.e., lower) incidence of incentive pay 
in that particular workplace representation regime. Alternatively put, we anticipate that a 
given payment by results scheme will have the same effect on strikes in either regime. 
Familiarly, then, the performance-related pay variable should have no effect on strikes 
beyond its implied impact arising from differential use in the two regimes.  
Our implementation of the instrumental variable approach uses the Conditional 
Mixed-Process (CMP) software (Roodman, 2011), which is well-suited to situations 
where right-hand-side observables include endogenous variables. CMP fits seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) models of a large family, including the case of a categorical 
left-hand-side variable and hierarchical (i.e. multi-level or clustered) data as in our case. 
In the presence of an endogenous variable, and given the availability of a valid instrument, 
the simultaneous system becomes a recursive system, similar to a two-stage least squares 
regression, the first-stage being given by the choice of works council status and the second 
by the strike incidence equation. We will test for the correlation in the error term across 
the first- and second-stage equations, where statistical significance denotes endogeneity 
in the system.  
We also address endogeneity within a multiple treatment effects framework. In 
this case, we compute four potential treatments where treatment t can assume the values 
0, 1, 2, and 3, denoting a nonunion-dominated union, a union-dominated union, a 
nonunion-dominated works council, and a union-dominated works council, respectively. 
For each establishment in the sample, therefore, we have one observed outcome and three 
potential outcomes, with the corresponding weights being given by the inverse sample 
probability. Intuitively, the inverse probability weighting is undertaken to ensure that 
actual outcomes are compared with the proper counterfactual; that is, to ensure that the 
difference in means between treated and untreated establishments is not simply a 
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difference between observed outcomes that would necessarily generate a bias in the 
presence of an endogenous variable.14 With all the usual caveats, we would contend that 
the two procedures – instrumental variables and the multiple treatment effects –  allow us 
to establish useful descriptive inference. They also permit the comparison of marginal 
effects and treatment effects using different methods. 
The principal hypotheses examined in this paper might usefully be summarized at 
this point. First, and most importantly, works councils should be associated with reduced 
strike activity because of their informational, consultative, and (ultimately) 
participative/codetermination roles. Second, more is expected of works councils than 
union forms of workplace representation by reason of dampened rent seeking propensity. 
Third, union density should be positively related to strike activity on enhanced capacity 
to strike grounds. Fourth, union domination of workplace entities – identified with 
situations where more than one-half of the agencies’ members are unionized – are more 
likely to be engaged in distributive bargaining and thence more prone to strikes. Fifth, the 
greater workplace dissonance, the less cooperative workplace industrial relations and the 
greater the likelihood of industrial conflict. Finally, and distinct from the above 
arguments, there are bargaining-theoretic reasons to suggest that other factors, such as 
changing workplace conditions and the degree of workplace and institutional complexity 
(as captured by firm size and multi-establishment entities), should be associated with 
higher strike propensity.15  
 
5. The association between workplace employee representation and strikes 
5.1. Workplace employee representation across Europe 
As described in the data section, in order to make the generated trade union and 
works council dummies sufficiently comparable across a large sample of countries we 
have used the notion of ‘formal’ workplace employee representation. Table 1 gives the 
incidence of union agencies and works councils by country, using unweighted data. 
(Corresponding statistics using weighted data are available upon request.) As in some 
countries the two agencies may coexist at the same workplace, separate columns of the 
table indicate for each country the percentage of establishments in which there is only a 
single formal representation agency (either a union entity or a works council, but not both) 
(see columns (1) and (2)), and the percentage of establishments with both types (column 
(3)). We also provide in column (5) information on the presence of any type of employee 
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representation (formal and informal), so that the incidence of informal representation can 
be easily derived by subtraction from column (4). 
(Table 1 near here) 
The last row of the table reports the overall, cross-country incidence of employee 
representation. Workplace representation in union bodies alone obtains in 14 percent of 
all establishments while representation through works councils alone is to be found in 18 
percent of the cases (columns (1) and (2), respectively). Formal representation is found 
in almost one-half of all selected European establishments (column (4)).  A comparison 
of the last two columns, reveals that informal representation amounts to a residual 2 to 3 
percent.  
The dispersion in the incidence of workplace representation across countries is 
wide. It ranges from more than 70 percent in Denmark, Sweden, France, Finland, and 
Sweden to less than 25 percent in Greece, Malta, Portugal, and Turkey. This heterogeneity 
is further demonstrated in the next subsection.  
(Table 2 near here) 
Table 2 uses the notion of prevalent or dominant employee workplace 
representation and distinguishes between a prevalent union and a prevalent works council 
agency. The last row entry of the table shows that, among establishments with a formal 
representation body, the split between the two cases is virtually equal at 24 percent.  
Taking into account the result from Table 1 that the sample probability of an 
establishment having a formal employee representation body is about 50 percent, it 
follows that roughly one in four of the sample of European establishments will have a 
union agency, one in four a works council variant, while two in four will have no formal 
employee representation at all. 
(Table 3 near here) 
Using the distinction between prevalent works councils and prevalent union 
entities, in conjunction with information on the percentage of trade union members in 
these employee representation bodies, Table 3 gives the percentage of union-dominated 
agencies. Overall, 61 percent of all establishments with formal employee representation 
have a majority of union members among the employee representatives. Whenever there 
is a single entity at the workplace, union dominance is higher among establishments with 
a union entity (78 percent) than in establishments with a works council (35 percent). It is 
also clear that the works council agency tends to be more often dominated by the union 
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where both agencies are present vis-à-vis the situation where the works council is the sole 
representative agency (55 and 35 percent, respectively). 
 
5.2. Strike incidence: main results 
Table 4 reports the first set of regression results generated by our modeling 
strategy. Our baseline model implementing equation (1) is presented in column (2) of the 
table, while the baseline model excluding the interactions between union density and the 
three worker representation arguments – works councils, union-dominated works 
councils, and union-dominated union clubs – is given in column (1). The role of column 
(1) is simply to make transparent the direct effects of worker representation and is 
henceforth addressed only in passing.  
(Table 4 and Figure 1 near here) 
As a starting point, observe that country heterogeneity is dealt with by introducing 
random country intercepts. The log-likelihood ratio tests at the base of each panel confirm 
that the two-level mixed effects model is preferable to an ordinary logistic regression, 
while the variance component ?̂?𝑢
2 is statistically significant, confirming that countries do 
differ in their strike incidence rate, other things equal. This variation is plotted in Figure 
1, where countries are arranged by increasing order, with Italy, Portugal, France, and 
Greece in particular showing higher than average intercepts (or a higher than average 
strike incidence) in both survey years. 
 Returning to the set of worker representation and union organization variables, 
contained in the first block of the table, observe that due to the fact that in the estimation 
sample a formal worker representation body is necessarily present at the establishment – 
either through a (prevalent) works council or a (prevalent) union – our two-level mixed-
effects logit model includes three workplace representation dummy variables. These 
respectively flag the presence of a works council, a union-dominated works council, and 
a union-dominated union entity. Accordingly, the coefficient on the first variable (works 
council) gives the nonunion-dominated works council ‘effect’ vis-à-vis the nonunion-
dominated union body; the second gives the union-dominated works councils ‘effect’ vis-
à-vis the works council without union domination, and the third gives the union-
dominated union ‘effect’ vis-à-vis the non-union dominated union body. 
From the second row of column (2), it can be seen that a nonunion-dominated 
works council agency is associated with a lower strike incidence than obtains where 
workplace representation is through a nonunion-dominated union agency or club. The 
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marginal effect is -0.06 and it is statistically significant at the .01 level. Recall from Table 
A.2 that the strike incidence mean is equal to 0.12. In contrast, the positive (and highly 
statistically significant) marginal effect of 0.08 for the union-dominated works council 
indicates that establishments in which a works council is dominated by union members 
have a higher incidence of strikes than situations in which there is no such majority. The 
marginal effect for a union-dominated union agency is in turn not statistically significant 
at conventional levels, suggesting union domination (a majority/minority of union 
members) is expected to be less of an issue whenever worker representation is in the form 
of a union delegation. Regarding the direct role of trade membership, there is every 
indication that higher union density at the establishment level implies a higher strike rate, 
but the magnitude of the marginal effect is small. Less obvious, however, is the role of 
the interaction between union density and workplace representation, with the two 
corresponding interaction terms failing to achieve strong statistical significance. 
Accordingly, we obtain the result that, once we control for the full set of workplace 
institutions, of the union organization arguments only the level of union density seems to 
play a discernible role. Union density will be further addressed in the context of the model 
specification in column (3). 
 A related issue is the recurring theme of multiunionism. However, the variable is 
not among the common set of regressors in Table 4. The reason is that information on 
number of unions at the workplace is missing in 15 percent of the cases, which would 
serve to further reduce the estimation sample. Nevertheless, in estimates not presented 
here (but available upon request), inclusion of a multiunionism variable failed to disturb 
either the signs or significance levels of the selected set of regressors included in column 
(1). At the same time, there was ringing confirmation of one statistical regularity in the 
strikes literature: the higher the number of trade unions at an establishment, the higher is 
strike incidence.   
For their part, single establishment firms clearly experience a lower strike 
incidence rate than their multi-establishment counterparts, while collective agreements at 
higher than company level are associated with a greater incidence of strikes even though 
neither company-level agreements nor the mixed collective agreements display statistical 
significance at conventional levels. The public sector is also more strike prone than the 
private sector. In terms of industry affiliation, it appears that the education sector is more 
strike-prone than manufacturing and energy (the omitted category), while all the other 
sectors reveal a lower strike incidence albeit never achieving statistical significance at the 
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0.01 level. Furthermore, larger establishments are more strike prone. The coefficient 
estimates for industry affiliation and establishment size are not provided in the table but 
are available from the authors upon request. 
 In columns (3) and (4) of the table we take a closer look at the role of the public 
sector and union density by allowing for random slopes of the two arguments across 
countries, no longer assuming, as in column (2) (and column 1), the presence of a unique, 
public sector/union density term common to all countries. If for a given country strike 
behavior is driven by the particular profile of the public sector – recall from column (2) 
that strike incidence is clearly higher in the public sector by a 0.05 margin – then we 
should expect a different pattern of results in column (3) than for column (2). Equally, if 
union density ultimately flags country idiosyncrasies, then country slopes will play a role 
such that the results in column (2) may no longer hold. (Accompanying both exercises, 
we also plotted the corresponding country (random) slopes; a higher than average country 
slope indicating that the ‘impact’ of the variable on the strike rate is larger in magnitude 
than the average, all else constant.) 
In particular, we see that allowing a country slope for either the public sector 
variable or establishment-level union density maintains the sign of the estimated marginal 
effects. It is true that the union density term alone is statistically weaker in column (4), 
and that the positive association between higher than company-level collective 
agreements and strikes no longer obtains, but the principal result from the baseline model 
– that the association between works councils and strike incidence is strongly negative 
where the entities are not union dominated – continues to hold if indeed not reinforced.  
 Country heterogeneity corresponding to columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 is shown 
in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. The random slopes in the former figure show less 
variability across countries than was the case for the random intercepts in Figure 1, 
whereas in the latter figure variability is perceptibly smaller across countries. Although 
on this occasion the country random intercepts are not shown, we note parenthetically 
that the country rankings earlier given in Figure 1 are largely maintained. 
(Figure 2 and 3 near here) 
Reflecting recent trends in the literature, we further analyze country heterogeneity 
by running our model for different country subsamples. We selected four subsamples 
divided into countries with a works council-type representation only (denoted S1); 
countries with a union-type representation only (S2); and countries with dual systems but 
in which the works council-type representation is found in more than 70% of the cases 
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(S3) or in which union-type representation is found in more than 70% of the cases (S4). 
We then tested whether our main findings reported in Table 4 continued to hold. Given 
the selected groups, one may for example test whether the work council in S1 and union 
delegation in S2 differ with respect to their association with strikes; or whether it is 
possible to obtain similar marginal effects by comparing establishments in countries in 
which works councils rule with their counterparts in countries where unions rule. 
(Table 5 near here) 
The findings are reported in Table 5. In the first column of the table we reproduce 
the results earlier given in column (1) of Table 4. Comparing these results with those for 
the country subsamples, it is apparent that both the sign and the magnitude of the 
estimated marginal effects are to a very large extent maintained in the latter. The principal 
exception is Case 4, which may be attributed to insufficient variation within the subset of 
S4 countries. Overall, union-dominated works councils are found to be associated with a 
0.06 to 0.08 greater strike incidence, while both the works council and the union-
dominated union terms behave as expected, as does the union density argument. As 
expected, we obtain lower statistical significance across the experiments, but there is no 
strong indication in the data that our findings in Table 4 are particularly sensitive to 
country subsets.16      
Strikes may be regarded as bargaining failures, and in Table 6 we next introduce 
a dissonance argument into the baseline model. As was discussed earlier, the dissonance-
augmented regression includes two dummies (Dissonance_1 and Dissonance_2) 
indicating situations in which management perceives the quality of industrial relations to 
be good or very good while the employee representative states that is to the contrary either 
bad or very bad, and conversely. It will be recalled that mutual agreement on there being 
a good or very good climate is the omitted category. In column (1) we see that the two 
variables are very much associated with strike incidence. Strike incidence is 0.05 higher 
in the case of Dissonance_1 and 0.02 higher in the case of Dissonance_2 than in the 
reference scenario, at the 0.05 statistical significance level or better. All the other reported 
coefficients remain very stable when compared with their counterparts in Table 4. 
(Table 6 near here) 
Next, columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 respectively introduce our organizational 
change arguments and an absence of workplace employee representation (as proxied by 
those interviewed establishments that report only the presence of informal 
representation).17 Beginning with the estimates in column (2), note that organizational 
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changes at the workplace are defined as changes in the preceding three years and can 
therefore be reasonably assumed to pre-date the strike event(s). As hypothesized in the 
modeling section, our expectation is that such changes will be an autonomous source of 
strike variation. Consistent with our priors, changes in the remuneration system do seem 
to generate higher strike incidence. However, the three remaining indicators of 
organizational change fail to generate any statistically significant marginal effect at 
conventional levels. 
Finally, the estimates reported in column (3) suggest that strike incidence is lower 
in both the presence of works councils and the absence of any (formal) employee 
representation compared with the union agency case. (Note that union agency is the 
omitted category as, by construction, we cannot distinguish between union- and 
nonunion-dominated informal representation.) That said, the coefficient estimate for the 
works council dummy is no longer statistically significant, which might suggest that 
formal worker representation – whether it is via a works council proper or a union club – 
may be of secondary importance to the issue of union domination. 
 
5.3 Strike incidence: instrumental variable and multivalued treatment estimates 
We now address the possible endogeneity of workplace representation, starting with an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach before implementing a multiple treatment 
methodology. In the IV approach it is simply assumed that all regressors are exogenous 
except works council/union status, where the instrument is given by a dichotomous 
variable taking the value of 1 if there is in the establishment any performance-related 
elements of pay for staff other than top management. The rationale for this procedure is 
discussed in Section 4, and is rooted in our theoretical remarks in Section 2.1. 
(Table 7 near here) 
Table 7 shows the results of the IV approach implemented using the CMP 
software. As described in the modeling section, CMP has the advantage of 
accommodating the presence of an endogenous regressor within a multi-level (clustered) 
data framework. First, for ease of comparison, we reproduce in column (1) of the table 
the estimates earlier reported in the first column of Table 6. Second, in column (2), we 
replicate the model now using the CMP command in Stata. This is to show that the CMP 
estimates conform to those generated by the original two-level mixed-effects logistic 
regression in column (1). Finally, in column (3) of the table are given the IV results using 
CMP. (The IV implementation within a multilevel mixed-effects model after Table 4 is 
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not available). The major finding is the confirmation of the union-dominated works 
council effect in the third row, as well as the nonunion-dominated works council effect 
in the second row. The corresponding marginal effects display a higher absolute 
magnitude than before. Also note that the selected instrument is statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level in the works council first-stage equation, and that the disturbances are 
statistically correlated across equations (in the last row). The IV approach therefore 
suggests that although endogeneity of workplace representation is a possibility, the nature 
of our findings in Tables 4 through 6 is unchanged. 
(Table 8 near here) 
The multiple treatment approach is documented in Table 8. Here, it is assumed 
that the presence of endogenous regressors can be mitigated by proper use of the set of 
observables. In particular, we seek to inversely weight individuals (i.e. establishments) 
for whom the probability of being ‘treated’ is observationally higher. The procedure 
involves the use of the teffects command in Stata. (Alternative multivalued treatment 
procedures were experimented with closely similar results.) It will be recalled that the 
multivalued or multiple treatment is defined as 0, 1, 2, or 3 if the establishment has, 
respectively, a nonunion-dominated union representation, a union-dominated union, a 
nonunion-dominated works council, or a union-dominated works council. The reported 
values in the table are the average treatment effect estimates; that is, they give the change 
in strike incidence generated by the corresponding treatment against the proper 
counterfactual. In the first row of the table, we have the estimated average treatment effect 
of union-dominated union representation versus a nonunion-dominated union agency (the 
default), while the second and third rows give the average treatment of having, 
respectively, a nonunion-dominated and a union-dominated works council representation 
versus the default. The fourth row generates the comparison between union domination 
versus nonunion domination of works council representation. Clearly, we obtain 
confirmation that union domination of works council is meaningful as both sets of 
estimates given in the third and fourth rows of the table are sizeable and statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level or better. By way of illustration, we see from the fourth row 
that union domination of a works council is estimated to result in a 0.06 greater 
probability of having a strike than the situation where there is no such domination. And 
as strikes are something of a rarity – the sample mean is 0.12 – the effects reported in 
Table 8 are tangible. 
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 Our procedures are only as good as the data and much hinges on the underlying 
assumptions. The set of observables although extensive is certainly not exhaustive and 
perhaps more importantly our cross-section lacks any longitudinal dimension. Thus, 
although the results of the multivalued treatment are encouraging, we would refrain from 
claiming strong causal inference and prefer to emphasize the descriptively inferential 
nature of our results. The instrumental variable and the multiple treatment effects provide 
us with the opportunity of comparing marginal and treatment effects across a large variety 
of models. Against this backdrop, our findings appear quite robust. 
 
6. Strike duration, strike frequency, and strike intensity 
In the interests of completeness, in a penultimate exercise we next provide results 
from replacing the strike incidence with alternative strike measures, each of which is an 
ordered categorical variable. 
For our strike duration, strike frequency, and strike intensity measures, three 
disjoint groups are generated; for example, in the case of strike duration, group 1 stands 
for ‘no strikes,’ group 2 for ‘strikes for less than one day,’ and group 3 for ‘strikes of one 
day or more.’ One obvious limitation is the reduction in the number of observations 
attendant upon some establishments with strikes being dropped from the sample, so that 
we are less likely to obtain well defined cutoff points in the corresponding ordered probit 
estimation than would otherwise obtain. 
(Table 9 near here) 
Our findings are given in Table 9 where, in the interests of parsimony, we only 
report the predicted probabilities of the three possible outcomes Pr1, Pr2, and Pr3 
(allocated to groups 1, 2 and 3, respectively) for each outcome indicator. We also confine 
our attention to a comparison of two particular workplace representation types: the union-
dominated works council and the nonunion-dominated works council. In the light of our 
preceding analysis, this comparison focuses on the most clear-cut case. The set of 
included regressors is the same as in column (1) of Table 5, and we note that all the 
estimated coefficients of the corresponding ordered logit model maintain their sign and 
statistical significance. Each of the cutoff points is also statistically significant.  
Beginning with the strike duration case (Case 1), works council establishments 
with union domination are clearly less likely to be free of strikes than their nonunion-
dominated counterparts, with probabilities of 0.780 and 0.933, respectively. Conversely, 
the probability of experiencing strikes for less than one day or strikes for one day or more 
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is visibly higher for union-dominated works councils, at 0.090 (versus 0.033) and 0.130 
(versus 0.034), respectively.  
These results carry over to Case 2, where the alternative strike measure is now 
given by the frequency variable (strike_N). Given that in the ‘more than one strike’ case 
we cannot for example distinguish a strike for 2 days from a strike for 5 days, the 
similarity between Cases 1 and 2 is not surprising. In any event, in looking at the sum of 
Pr2 and Pr3 (i.e. 0.220 and 0.200, respectively), it seems that union-dominated works 
councils are very slightly more likely to experience a longer duration of strikes than be 
involved in a higher number of strikes. 
In Case 3, we offer a further refinement, this time in seeking to model strike 
intensity rather more rigorously. The case entry has four columns in each of which we 
have groups 1 and 2 defined as ‘none’ and ‘one strike for less than a day,’ respectively; 
whereas group 3 is differently defined in columns (2), (3) and (4) – as ‘one strike for one 
day or more,’ ‘more than one strike for less than one day,’ and ‘more than one strike for 
one day or more,’ respectively – thereby introducing some intensity ordering. In column 
(1), group 3 is defined as ‘all else,’ which is some amalgamation of the cases defined in 
columns (2) though (4). As explained in the data section, searching for higher precision 
in the outcome measure comes at the cost of an even smaller estimation sample, so that 
the number of establishments in groups 1 and 2 in columns (1) and (4) declines from 417 
to 201. 
Two main conclusions can be extracted from Case 3. First, there is confirmation 
that Pr1 is persistently smaller among union-dominated works councils, while Pr2 and 
Pr3 are always higher. Second, there is no indication that union-dominated works councils 
favor ‘more than one strike for one day or more’ (column (4)) over, ‘one strike for one 
day or more’ (column (2)). Rather, the evidence is to the contrary. 
 
7. ER survey respondents versus non-respondents 
The ER survey provides information on strikes, worker representation, and labor 
organization at the workplace, but is conducted for only a subset of the MM-interviewed 
establishments. Based on the MM interviews, we know exactly whether there is a formal 
or informal (or indeed no) worker representation. However, given that not all 
establishments with worker representation are actually interviewed, an unsettled issue is 
whether the reported results are driven by an unrepresentative set of respondents. By 
using the full sample of respondents and non-respondents, in a final exercise we test for 
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the presence of any obvious non-response bias arising from any unobserved self-selection 
mechanism that renders the set of ER respondents unrepresentative of the entire 
population of establishments with a formal employee representation body. 
Our approach amounts to using a common set of regressors, necessarily extracted 
from the MM questionnaire, and then running an establishment performance model so as 
to establish the extent to which the non-ER respondents are statistically different from the 
ER respondents. To this end, we use a behavioral model linking establishment 
performance to a set of observed establishment characteristics. The simplified model in 
Table 10 specifies establishment economic/financial performance as a function of a 
common set of regressors that includes sector affiliation, establishment size, collective 
agreement type, single establishment and public sector status, as well as the prevalent 
form of employee representation. Establishment performance is based on the subjective 
responses of management; the actual variable being a dichotomous measure equal to 1 if 
the economic/financial situation of establishment is assessed by management as either 
very good or good, 0 otherwise. 
(Table 10 near here) 
Observe that labor organization arguments cannot be included in the model as 
information on these institutions is only available in the ER questionnaire. Similarly, as 
our dissonance indicator is not available for non-respondents, we elect to use the 
manager-respondent’s perception of the quality of industrial relations at the workplace – 
even if this indicator is in principle more subject to feedback from performance than is 
dissonance from strikes.  
The key argument is ERint which flags the situation where an employee 
representative has actually been interviewed. As can be seen from the table, this dummy 
variable is not statistically significant, suggesting that there is no statistical difference 
across the two groups of respondents and non-respondents. The model also indicates that 
the industrial relations climate and works council representation are positively associated 
with establishment performance. Assuming therefore that the set of regressors included 
in the performance model is not too alien to the explanation of the strike event, there is 
little reason to suppose that the results presented in the preceding tables are driven by an 
unrepresentative set of respondents. 
 
8. Conclusions  
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Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Beginning with our baseline 
model, the principal finding is that a (prevalent) works council is associated with a lower 
strike incidence than the case in which the workplace representation operates through a 
union agency. That said, where union dominated (i.e., where a majority of works 
councilors are union members), works councils have a higher incidence of strikes than 
otherwise. As far as union organization is concerned, the connection with strikes is direct: 
union density at the workplace is associated with greater strike incidence. These and other 
results largely continue to obtain once we allow for random slopes of the public sector 
and union density arguments and indeed different country subsamples. Another important 
result is the relevance of dissonance between the parties (as indexed by degree of 
divergence between the opinions of employer and employee representative survey 
respondents as to the state of industrial relations at the workplace) to the strike outcome. 
In turn, the model containing establishments with informal workplace representation 
suggests that formal representation may ultimately be of secondary importance to union 
domination in explaining strike incidence.  
Our principal result regarding union-dominated works councils carried over to 
estimations based on three additional strike measures, namely strike duration, strike 
frequency, and strike duration. Further, recognition of the potential endogeneity of formal 
workplace representation arguments did not blunt the thrust of our baseline models. 
Similarly, a separate analysis of establishment financial performance failed to provide 
any evidence of material nonresponse bias in the strikes analysis. Thus, the one constant 
obtaining across the various experiments conducted here was the seemingly key role 
played by union domination of the workplace representative body in elevating strikes. 
The policy issues raised by this study are not immediate because our findings are 
based on a single cross section of data, because the superiority of the works council is not 
a datum but instead hinges on its type, because good industrial relations may after all 
trump institutional design, and because strikes are but one outcome indicator and 
arguably, at their current modest levels, subordinate to other measures of performance. 
Nevertheless, a prima facie case can be made for encouraging the expression of collective 
voice through the agency of works councils while seeking to mitigate rent-seeking 
behavior. The more extensive the powers granted the works council, the greater the 
attention to be accorded the latter. A complication arises from our finding of the seeming 
benefits of informal voice. Although we chose not to interpret the latter result as 
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overturning the potential benefits of works councils free of union domination, one issue 
raised by informal voice is the pressing need to re-examine the benefits of direct voice. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. The 2013 European Company Survey is also available but the decision was taken not to include 
it in our analysis given pronounced within-country differences in union and works council 
incidence across the 2009 and 2013 surveys. The inconsistency was mostly due to discrepancies 
in the selection of the Employee Representative Questionnaire respondent.  Deploying both 
surveys would thus require some ad hoc procedure to make the incidence of works council and 
union representation more consistent over time. Further, two of the three alternative strike 
measures (strike frequency and strike intensity) are unavailable in the 2013 survey. Finally, 
reflecting confidentiality constraints, the Management and the Employee Representative 
Questionnaires are provided in separate files in the 2013 ECS. As a result, some matching 
procedure is required to construct the estimation sample containing variables from the two 
component surveys. Unfortunately, the large reduction in sample size implied by the matching 
procedure means that the number of included establishments per country is very small, adversely 
affecting country representativeness. Limited results for 2013 are nevertheless available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
2. And might not voice sourced through a union be more an expression of dissatisfaction with the 
status quo than a communication channel facilitating continuing innovation in labor contracts?  
 
3. Bryson et al. (2010) also advance the interesting argument that the negative association between 
union membership and satisfaction is confined to uncovered employees who express 
dissatisfaction with the purpose of achieving coverage. 
 
4. Freeman and Medoff (1984: 179) state that: “…unionism per se is neither a plus nor a minus 
to productivity. What matters is how unions and management interact at the workplace.” 
 
5. For a related argument as to why participatory institutions are rare in the United States, see 
Levine and Tyson (1991) who argue on externality grounds that the market may be systematically 
biased against participatory workplaces despite their efficiency, and remain stuck in an inferior 
equilibrium. Participatory workplaces, so the argument runs, rely on narrower wage differentials 
and just-cause dismissal policies for their traction. These arrangements occasion no difficulty if a 
participatory firm’s policies are also practiced by others. Where this is not the case, the 
participatory firm will find its best workers quitting and encounter a disproportionate number of 
shirkers in its applicant pool. 
 
6. Explanations for the frequent occurrence of strikes are of course to be found in non-cooperative 
bargaining theory (where strikes are interpreted as a costly means of communicating the private 
information of employers) and in political models of strikes (where strikes are viewed as an 
equilibrating mechanism employed by union leadership as a means of eroding the unrealistically 
high wage aspiration of the membership).  
 
7. Using industry-sector-level data for seven European countries, 1990–2006, Akkerman finds a 
strong direct relationship between multiunionism and strike incidence. Her explanation is that 
divided unions make propagandistic use of strikes to attract members. 
 
8. In a stand-alone analysis of a subjective productivity measure from the 2013 ECS, Braakmann 
and Brandl (2016) focus on the performance of the collective bargaining system, as represented 
by a 12-element categorization of bargaining type. 
 
9. The authors do not attempt link the two parts of their analysis. However, for a study using a 
subjective measure of firm economic performance from the 2009 ECS that does seek to control 
for the potential endogeneity of what is termed the ‘information and consultation body,’ see van 
den Berg et al. (2013). 
 
32 
 
10. Analytically, the presence of possible non-response bias is tackled in the final section of this 
paper. We note here, however, that there seems to be no reason for concern among MM 
establishments: if an establishment is selected for an MM interview, but not interviewed because 
of an incorrect address, refusal to answer, etc., the missing establishment is then replaced by a 
similar establishment. Indeed, four to five establishments are on average required to be contacted 
in order to have one valid interview. A more debatable issue is non-response in the ER survey. 
Here, approximately 50 percent of all establishments with a reported (by the MM respondent) 
employee representation body fail to answer the ER questionnaire. To address this issue 
descriptively, we divided the sample into two groups (comprising establishments with a valid ER 
interview and establishments with no interview) and computed the standardized bias across the 
two groups. The mean standardized bias is approximately 5 percent, suggesting that the covariates 
are sufficiently balanced (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Below, we complement this analysis by 
using a simple behavioral model and again fail to detect any obvious indication of bias.  
 
11. The information is taken from the file 6568english_questionnaires, pp. 86-96, which can be 
found at the site https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/. 
 
12. Apart from identifying strikes lasting one or more days the ECS also inquires as to whether 
the (composite) industrial action was part of a broader campaign at the national, regional, or 
sectoral level as opposed to being confined to the respondent’s own enterprise. Specifically, 
questions ER263a and ER263b ask this question for single and multiple stoppages, respectively. 
In each case, as we have seen, the respondent is asked to identify the form of the stoppage. This 
does not occasion problems in the case of single stoppages but it does for multiple stoppages. 
First of all, where the respondent claims that stoppages were of both types – that is, both confined 
to the firm and broader than the firm – it is clearly impossible to distinguish between local and 
broader stoppages. Second of all, it is now also unclear whether in indicating the level at which 
industrial action occurred the respondent is referring to a strike event proper or to another 
identified type of industrial action (namely, a ‘refusal to do overtime’ or ‘other actions’). For both 
reasons, therefore, we decided not to model ‘broad’ versus ‘confined’ strikes. 
 
13. As a practical matter, the jury is still out on the association between high performance work 
practices and workplace representation (e.g., Gill, 2009; Fairris and Askenazy, 2010). 
 
14. To illustrate, if Y depends on X and treatment W, and if W happens to be positively correlated 
with X, ideally one would like to give more weight to those individuals/establishments that are 
less likely to be treated as they are in principle less contaminated by the effect of X. In practice, 
we use the treatment effects command of Stata for multivalued treatments with the inverse-
probability weighting option. 
 
15. The omission of collective bargaining as opposed to union organization in this summary 
reflects disputation over the precise role of the level of collective bargaining in mediating 
economic and behavioral/industrial relations outcomes. 
 
16. We also investigated the baseline model for two broader subsamples of countries, namely 
western European countries in which workplace representation has a long tradition and blocs of 
western European countries with different state traditions. In the latter case we draw on Blanchard 
and Philippon (2006) and distinguish between three types of western European country based on 
the attitude of the nation state towards early unions, as alternatively supportive, hostile, and 
neutral, where the latter is the omitted category. The results from the first experiment closely 
follow the results shown in column (1) of Table 4, with some added precision as to the ‘impact’ 
of works councils and union-dominated works councils. For their part, the results from the second 
exercise support the notion that nations evincing a hostile attitude toward unions are rewarded 
with significantly higher strike incidence. Again, these results are available from the authors upon 
request.  
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17. Note that as all the ER-interviewed units have by definition formal employee representation, 
the results presented thus far lack any comparative track across groups with and without worker 
representation. 
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Table 1  
Types of union and non-union employee workplace representation, 2009 (in percent).  
 
Country 
Union 
representation 
only 
(1) 
Works council 
representation 
only 
(2) 
Both union and works 
council representation 
 
(3) 
Formal employee 
representation  
 
(4) 
Employee 
representation present  
 
(5) 
BE-Belgium 8 14 25 47 65 
BG-Bulgaria 10 22 13 45 45 
CZ-Czech Rep. 28 3 3 34 35 
DK-Denmark 20 8 46 74 76 
DE-Germany 0 47 0 47 61 
EE-Estonia 2 17 6 25 25 
IE-Ireland 17 10 16 43 45 
EL-Greece 6 2 5 13 13 
ES-Spain 0 63 0 63 68 
FR- France 5 21 45 71 74 
HR-Croatia 19 6 27 52 52 
IT-Italy 2 5 56 63 63 
CY-Cyprus 42 0 0 42 41 
LV-Latvia 7 15 19 41 44 
LT-Lithuania 19 16 4 39 40 
LU-Luxembourg 0 59 0 59 60 
HU-Hungary 7 11 20 38 39 
MT-Malta 19 0 0 19 20 
NL-Netherlands 1 55 9 65 68 
AT-Austria 0 42 0 42 44 
PL-Poland 19 15 19 53 55 
PT-Portugal 8 2 3 13 13 
RO-Romania 8 42 18 68 68 
SI-Slovenia 23 3 29 55 56 
SK-Slovakia 23 22 12 57 56 
FI-Finland 31 2 41 74 79 
SE-Sweden 75 0 0 75 80 
UK-United Kingdom 7 16 13 36 33 
MK-Macedonia 36 0 0 36 36 
TR-Turkey 14 0 0 14 15 
All 14 18 16 48 50 
Notes: Column (4) is defined as (4) = (1) + (2) + (3). Column (3) flags the cases in which union 
and works council representation coexist at the workplace. Column (5) gives the percentage of 
all establishments with a workplace employee representation body (formal or informal). 
Sources: Authors’ computations using the 2009 European Company Survey, unweighted data.  
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Table 2 
Prevalent employee workplace representation categories, 2009 (in percent). 
 
 
 
Country Union representation prevalent Works council representation prevalent 
BE-Belgium 8 39 
BG-Bulgaria 22 22 
CZ-Czech Rep. 31 3 
DK-Denmark 66 8 
DE-Germany 0 47 
EE-Estonia 8 17 
IE-Ireland 33 10 
EL-Greece 11 2 
ES-Spain 0 63 
FR- France 5 66 
HR-Croatia 45 6 
IT-Italy 28 35 
CY-Cyprus 42 0 
LV-Latvia 26 15 
LT-Lithuania 23 16 
LU-Luxembourg 0 59 
HU-Hungary 27 11 
MT-Malta 19 0 
NL-Netherlands 1 63 
AT-Austria 0 42 
PL-Poland 38 15 
PT-Portugal 11 2 
RO-Romania 26 42 
SI-Slovenia 52 3 
SK-Slovakia 35 22 
FI-Finland 72 2 
SE-Sweden 75 0 
UK-United Kingdom 19 17 
MK-Macedonia 36 0 
TR-Turkey 14 0 
All 24 24 
Notes: A prevalent works council refers to situations in which there is either a unique works 
council at the workplace or where the works council agency can be adjudged more influential 
than the corresponding union agency where both entities are present. Mutatis mutandis for a 
prevalent union. In practice, if the works council and the union agencies coexist at the workplace 
and the employee representative respondent is from the works council (union), then the works 
council (union) prevails. 
Sources: Authors’ computations using the 2009 European Company Survey, unweighted data.  
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Table 3   
Union dominance in works councils and union agencies, 2009 (in percent). 
 
  
 
Union 
representation 
only 
 
 
Works council 
representation 
only 
Both union and works-council 
representation present 
All 
establishments 
with a formal 
employee 
representation 
Assigned as 
union 
representation 
Assigned as 
works council 
representation 
2009      
Union dominated 78 35 76 55 61 
Note: See notes to Table 2.  
 
 
Table 4 
The effect of workplace employee representation on strike incidence, marginal effects, 2009.  
 
 
  
Model without 
interactions 
(1) 
Baseline model 
 
(2) 
Baseline model 
with a random 
slope for the public 
sector 
(3) 
Baseline model 
with a random 
slope for union 
density  
(4) 
Worker representation/Labor 
organization:   
 
 
Union density 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0008 *** 
(0.0003) 
0.0008* 
(0.0004) 
Works council 
 
-0.069*** 
(0.020) 
-0.060*** 
(0.020) 
-0.054*** 
(0.019) 
-0.052*** 
(0.019)   
Union-dominated works 
council 
0.068*** 
(0.017) 
0.080*** 
(0.021)   
0.071*** 
(0.020) 
0.124*** 
(0.021)    
Union-dominated union 
agency 
-0.010 
(0.012)   
0.021 
(0.020) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
0.042 
(0.027) 
Union-dominated works 
council * Union density  
0.021 
(0.020) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004) 
Union-dominated union 
agency * Union density  
-0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0008* 
(0.0004) 
Collective agreement type:     
Company level 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.014)   
Higher than company level 
0.029** 
(0.013) 
0.029** 
(0.013) 
0.027** 
(0.012) 
0.0197 
(0.014) 
Mixed level 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.018 
(0.020) 
     
Public sector 
0.051*** 
(0.014) 
0.050*** 
(0.014) 
0.047** 
(0.021) 
0.062*** 
(0.013) 
Single establishment 
-0.024*** 
(0.009) 
-0.024*** 
(0.009) 
-0.021** 
(0.008) 
-0.028*** 
(0.009) 
N 5,388 5,388 5,388 5,388 
Log likelihood -1,512.7 -1,510.8 -1,497.7 -1,020.3 
?̂?𝑢1
2  (s.e.) [random slope] 
?̂?𝑢0
2  (s.e.) [random intercept] 
 
1.901 (0.580) 
1.860 (0.570) 
 
0.899 (0.416) 
1.777 (0.568) 
1.94e-06 (7.25e-07) 
0.007 (0.003) 
LR test [p-value] 433.3 [0.000] 417.6 [0.000] 443.9 [0.000] 555.9 [0.000] 
Notes: Model specification for columns (1) and (2) is based on equation (1) in the text, while 
equation (2) is used for columns (3) and (4). Works council (union) denotes the presence of a 
prevalent works council (union). See notes to Table 2. The coefficients are estimated using the 
melogit command in Stata 15.0. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5   
The effect of workplace employee representation on strike incidence in selected subsamples, marginal effects, 2009. 
 
 Replicating Table 
4, column (1) 
Case 1 
S1 and S2 
countries 
Case 2 
S3 and S4 
countries 
Case 3 
S3 countries 
Case 4 
S4 countries 
Case 5 
S1 and S4 
countries 
Case 6 
S1 and S3 
countries 
Type of workplace representation and 
labor organization: 
   
 
 
  
 
  
Union density 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0005* 
(0.0003)   
0.0006** 
(0.0002)   
 0.0006*    
(0.0004)      
 0.0006 
(0.0003) 
 0.0006** 
 (0.0003) 
0.0006** 
(0.0003)      
Works council 
-0.069*** 
(0.020) 
-0.097** 
(0.045) 
-0.0734 *** 
(0.027) 
-0.095** 
(0.043)     
-0.066 
(0.043)     
-0.087** 
(0.036) 
-0.073  
(0.033) 
Union-dominated works council 
0.068*** 
(0.017) 
0.059** 
(0.024) 
0.067*** 
(0.023) 
0.070** 
(0.030)      
 0.011 
(0.063)      
0.083*** 
(0.029) 
0.061**  
(0.024) 
Union-dominated union agency 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.093** 
(0.041) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
-0.015 
(0.034) 
-0.008 
(0.017)    
-0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.010  
(0.024) 
N 5,388 1,368 3,529 1,183 2,346 3,217 2,054 
LR test [p-value] 433.3 [0.000] 47.20 [0.000] 284.76 [0.000] 56.28 [0.000] 186.64 [0.000] 247.87 [0.000] 164.79 [0.000] 
Notes: Cases 1 to 6 are implemented using the model specified in Table 4, column (1). S1(S2) is defined as the set of countries with a works council-type 
representation only (with a union-type representation only); and S3 (S4) contains countries with dual systems but in which works council-type representation is 
found in more than 70% of the cases (in which union-type representation is found in more than 70% of the cases). Given the definitions, Bulgaria and United 
Kingdom are not included in any of the four sets. 
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Table 6.  
The effect of workplace employee representation on strike incidence, with control for dissonance 
as to the perceived quality of industrial relations at the establishment, selected subsamples, 
marginal effects, 2009. 
  
 
Dissonance-
augmented Baseline 
model 
 
(1) 
Baseline model with 
organizational 
changes 
 
(2) 
With the addition of 
establishments having 
informal workplace 
representation 
(3) 
Worker representation/Labor organization: 
   
Union density 
0.0009***    
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
Works council 
-0.052***  
(0.019) 
-0.052*** 
(0.020) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
No formal workplace representation 
 
 
-0.078** 
(0.039) 
Union-dominated works council 
0.084*** 
(0.022) 
0.084*** 
(0.022)  
Union-dominated union agency 
0.025 
(0.020) 
0.026 
(0.021)  
Union-dominated works council * Union 
density 
-0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0006* 
(0.0003)  
Union-dominated union agency * Union 
density 
-0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0007 ** 
(0.0003)  
Collective agreement type: 
 
  
Company level 
0.017  
(0.012) 
0.018   
(0.012)   
0.020* 
(0.011) 
Higher than company level 
0.029** 
(0.013) 
0.030** 
(0.013) 
0.035*** 
(0.013) 
Mixed level 
0.0002   
(0.014) 
0.002   
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
Public sector 
0.054*** 
(0.015) 
0.051*** 
(0.014) 
0.053*** 
(0.014) 
Single establishment 
-0.022** 
(0.009) 
-0.022** 
(0.009) 
-0.027*** 
(0.009) 
Dissonance: 
 
  
Dissonance_1 
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.048*** 
(0.013) 
0.043*** 
(0.012) 
Dissonance_2 
0.023** 
(0.010) 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.022** 
(0.009) 
Organizational changes: 
  
 
Changes in the remuneration system 
 0.020** 
(0.009)  
Changes in the work process 
 -0.005 
(0.008)  
Changes in the working time  
 -0.014 
(0.009)  
Restructuring measures 
 0.001 
(0.008)  
N 5,080 4,984 5,297 
Log likelihood -1,378.2   -1,353.7 -1,378.2 
?̂?𝑢
2 (s.e.)  1.813 (0.561) 1.837(0.569) 1.813 (0.561) 
LR test [p-value] 365.7  [0.000] 352.3  [0.000] 365.7 [0.000] 
Note: See notes to Table 4. 
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Table 7 
The effect of workplace employee representation on strike incidence, instrumental variable 
estimates, selected marginal effects, 2009. 
 
 
Dissonance-augmented 
Baseline model 
(Table 6, first column) 
(1)  
Dissonance-augmented 
Baseline model using 
CMP 
(2) 
Instrumental variable 
estimates using CMP 
 
(3) 
Worker representation/Labor 
organization:    
Union density 
0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0005**  
(0.0002)  
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Works council 
-0.052*** 
(0.019) 
-0.043*  
(0.025)    
-0.106***  
(0.027) 
Union-dominated works council 
0.084*** 
(0.022) 
0.084*** 
(0.017) 
0.112*** 
(0.018) 
Union-dominated union agency 
0.025   
(0.020) 
-0.007   
(0.025) 
-0.040* 
(0.021) 
    
Dissonance_1  
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.058*** 
(0.017) 
0.057*** 
(0.015) 
Dissonance_2  
0.023**   
(0.010) 
0.029**   
(0.014)   
0.027 ** 
(0.013) 
?̂?𝑢
2 (s.e.) 1.813 (0.561) 0.724 (0.076) 0.718 (0.072) 
N 5,080 5,080 5,087 
Log likelihood -1,378.2   -1,448.0 -2,366.4    
Cross-equation correlation in the 
instrumental variable approach 
  0.373 (0.081) 
Notes:  The selected instrument in column (3) is given by a dummy variable defined as equal to 
1 if there is in the establishment any performance related elements of pay for staff other than the 
top management, 0 otherwise. In all columns of the table, the implementation includes country 
random intercepts as specified in model (1) in the text. Works council status is assumed 
exogenous in columns (1) and (2) and endogenous in (3). The instrument is statistically significant 
in the works council first-stage equation (at the .05 level), while the exclusion restriction is 
satisfied as the evidence suggests that the instrument only impacts strike incidence through its 
effect on the choice of works council/union. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
 Average treatment effects with multiple treatments and inverse probability weights, 2009. 
 
 
Treatment and control groups: 
Average Treatment Effect 
 
Union-dominated union versus nonunion-dominated 
union representation 
-0.010 
(0.017) 
Nonunion-dominated works council versus nonunion-
dominated union representation 
0.020 
(0.027) 
Union-dominated works council versus nonunion-
dominated union representation 
      0.080*** 
(0.022) 
Union-dominated works council versus nonunion-
dominated works council 
    0.059** 
(0.028) 
N 5,073 
Notes: The multivalued or multiple treatment is defined as 0, 1, 2, or 3 if the establishment has, 
respectively, a nonunion-dominated union representation, a union-dominated union, a nonunion-
dominated works council, or a union-dominated works council. The average treatment effect is 
obtained using the teffects  aipw (i.e. the augmented inverse-probability weighting) command in 
Stata. The set of observables is the same as in Table 6, column (1). ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Predicted probabilities of strike duration, strike frequency, and strike intensity by composite workplace employee representation type, 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
Workplace employee 
representation type 
Case 1 
Strike duration 
(Dependent variable: strike_dur) 
[1 for ‘No strikes’; 2 for ‘less than one day’; 3 for ‘one day or more’] 
 
Case 2 
Strike frequency 
(Dependent variable: strike_N) 
[1 for ‘No strikes’; 2 for ‘one strike’; 3 for ‘more than one strike’] 
 
 Pr1 Pr2 Pr3 Pr1 Pr2 Pr3 
Union-dominated works council 0.780         0.090 0.130 0.800          0.121 0.079 
Nonunion-dominated works council 0.933         0.033 0.034 0.943        0.039 0.018 
 Case 3 
Strike intensity 
(Dependent variable: strike_ord) 
[1 for ‘No strikes’; 2 for ‘one 
strike for less than a day’; 3  for 
‘all else’] 
(1) 
(Dependent variable: strike_ord) 
[1 for ‘No strikes’; 2 for ‘one strike 
for less than a day’; 3  for ‘one 
strike for one day or more’] 
(2) 
(Dependent variable: strike_ord) 
[1 for ‘No strikes’; 2 for ‘one strike 
for less than a day’; 3  for ‘more 
than one strike for less than one 
day’] 
(3) 
(Dependent variable: strike_ord) 
[1 for ‘No strikes’; 2 for ‘one 
strike for less than a day’; 3  for 
‘more than one strike for one day 
or more’] 
(4) 
 Pr1 Pr2 Pr3 Pr1 Pr2 Pr3 Pr1 Pr2 Pr3 Pr1 Pr2 Pr3 
Union-dominated works council 0.858         0.051 0.091 0.900         0.047 0.053 0.909         0.069 0.022 0.911          0.069 0.020 
Nonunion-dominated works council 0.956         0.018 0.026 0.965         0.017 0.018 0.976         0.019 0.005 0.977        0.018  0.005 
Notes: The predicted probabilities are obtained using the postestimation command meologit in Stata 15.0. For strike duration in Case 1, for example, Pr1, Pr2, 
and Pr3 give the probability of an establishment having no strikes, at least one strike of less than a day, and at least one strike of a day or more, respectively, 
conditional on the set of included variables. Accordingly, the first cell entry on the top left (i.e. 0.780) gives the mean probability of an establishment with a 
union-dominated works council experiencing no strikes over a period of one year.  The set of included regressors is the same as in Table 6, column (1). Full 
description of the variables strike_dur, strike_N and strike_ord are given in the Appendix. 
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Table 10  
An analysis of non-response bias using firm performance as the dependent variable, 2009.  
 
 
 
All establishments with formal employee representation 
 
Sector:  
Construction 0.384*** 
Wholesale, retail, and vehicles 0.256*** 
Hotels and restaurants 0.244* 
Transport and communication 0.248** 
Financial intermediation 1.261*** 
Real estate  0.504*** 
Public administration 0.039 
Education 0.089 
Health  0.081 
Other  0.291*** 
Establishment size:  
20-49 0.135* 
50-99 0.106 
100-149 0.317*** 
150-199 0.123 
200-249 0.283** 
250-299 -0.002 
300-399 0.320*** 
400-499 -0.027 
500+ 0.143* 
Collective agreement type:  
Company level 0.138** 
Higher than company level 0.084 
Mixed 0.130 
Works council  0.179*** 
IR quality/Management view only 1.432*** 
Public sector -0.146 
Single  establishment 0.0654* 
ERint  -0.016 
N  11,886 
Log likelihood -7,488.2 
?̂?𝑢
2 (s.e.)  0.243 (0.069) 
LR test [p-value] 354.68 [0.000] 
Notes: The reported coefficients are obtained by using a two-level mixed-effects logistic model 
similar to model (1) in the text. The sample is given by all the establishments with a formal 
employee representation body. The dummy ERint flags the situation where an employee 
representative has actually been interviewed. The dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is given by the 
performance dummy variable economic/financial situation, defined as 1 if the economic/financial 
situation of the establishment is adjudged very good or good, 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. In the interests of economy, 
standard errors have been omitted from the table. 
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Figure 1 
Country random intercepts by increasing order.    
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Country random slopes for the public sector variable case. 
   
 
  
Figure 3 
Country random slopes for the union density variable case.  
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TABLE A.1 
Mapping workplace formal employee representation to establishments and countries, 2009. 
 
Country 
 
Trade union representation 
 
Works council type of representation 
BE 
Belgium  
Délégation syndicale Comité d'entreprise (MM650_2) 
Comité de negociation particulier ou de base (MM650_3) 
BG 
Bulgaria 
Синдикална организация Представители за информиране и консултиране на 
pаботниците (MM650_2) 
CZ 
Czech Rep. 
Odborová organizasse Rada zaměstnanců (MM650_2) 
DK 
Denmark 
Tillidsrepræsentant Samarbejdsudvalg (MM650_2) 
MED-udvalg (MM650_3) 
DE 
Germany 
No trade union representation Betriebsrat (MM650_2) 
Personalrat (MM650_3) 
EE 
Estonia 
Ametiühing Töötajate usaldusisik (MM650_2) 
Euroopa Töönõukogu (MM650_3) 
IE  
Ireland 
Workplace trade union representative Statutory employee representative forum (MM650_2) 
EL 
Greece 
Επιχειρησιακό σωματείο Συμβούλιο εργαζομένων (MM650_2) 
ES 
Spain 
No trade union representation in 2009 Comité de empresa (MM650_2) 
Junta de personal (MM650_3 Sección syndical in 2013  
FR 
France 
Délégué syndical Comité d'entreprise (MM650_2) 
 
IT 
Italy 
Organizzazione sindacale in 2009; 
Rappresentanza 
sindicale aziendale in 2013 
Rappresentanza sindacale unitaria (RSU) (MM650_2) 
Rappresentanza sindacale aziendale (RSA) (MM650_3) 
CY 
Cyprus 
Συνδικαλιστική Εκπροσώπηση No works council-type representation 
LV 
Latvia 
 
arodbiedrība 
 
Darbinieku pilnvarotie pārstāvji 
(MM650_2) 
Darba padome (MM650_3) 
LT 
Lithuania 
Profesinė sąjunga Darbo taryba (MM650_2) 
LU 
Luxembourg 
No trade union representation Comité mixte de entreprise (MM650_2) 
Délégation du personnel (MM650_3) 
HU 
Hungary 
Szakszervezet (bizalmi) Üzemi tanács (MM650_2) 
Üzemi megbízott (MM650_2) 
MT  
Malta 
Shop steward (recognized union 
representative) 
No works council-type representation 
NL 
Netherlands 
Bedrijfsledengroep in 2009 Ondernemingsraad  (MM650_2) 
 No trade union representation in 2013 
AT 
Austria 
No trade union representation Betriebsrat (MM650_2) 
Personalvertretung (MM650_3) 
PL 
Poland 
 Zakladowa organizacja zwiazkowa Rady pracowników (MM650_2) 
Przedstawiciele zalóg w radach nadzorczych (MM650_3) 
PT 
Portugal 
Comissão sindical or Comissão 
intersindical 
Comissão de trabalhadores (MM650_2) 
RO 
Romania 
Sindicat Reprezentanţii salariaţilor  
(MM650_2) 
SI 
Slovenia 
Sindikalni zaupnik Svet delavcev 
(MM650_2) 
SK 
Slovakia 
Základná organizácia odborového zväzu in 2009; 
Odborová organizácia in 2013 
Zamestnaneckárada 
(MM650_2) 
FI 
Finland 
Ammattiosasto YT-toimikunta 
(MM650_2) 
SE 
Sweden 
Facklig förtroendeman No works council representation 
UK 
United Kingdom 
Recognised shopfloor trade union 
representation 
Joint consultative committee, employee forum or 
equivalent body 
(MM650_2)  
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HR  
Croatia 
Sindikat Radnicko vijece (MM650_2) 
Predstavnik (MM650_3) 
MK 
Macedonia 
Recognised shop floor trade union 
organization in 2009; Синдикат/Sindikatë 
in 2013 
No works council-type representation 
TR 
Turkey 
Sendika İşyeri Temsilciliği in 2009; 
Ticaret Birlikleri in 2013 
No works council-type representation 
Notes: The mapping is based on the available raw MM variables. Supplementary information was taken 
from the 2009 ECS technical reports. The dataset includes 7 raw employee representation groups. 
Typically, group 1 flags a formal union representation, while groups 2 and 3 identify formal works council-
type agencies. In general, groups 4-7 comprise informal union and non-union worker representation. In 
practice, in 2009 union workplace representation is exclusively based on the raw dummy variables 
MM650_1. The basis for the construction of the works council dummy is given by the raw variables 
MM650_2. In some countries these variables were supplemented by the information based on variables 
MM650_3-MM650_7. To reduce the margin of error, in all cases in which we were not sure whether the 
works council-type agency was a formal employee representation body, we exclusively used the variable 
MM650_B as the basis for the trade union and works council-type representation. The variables MM650_1 
and MM650_2 are documented in the files 6568english_questionnaires (pp. 86-96), available at the U.K. 
Data Service site. 
Source: The 2009 European Company Survey and corresponding technical reports. 
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TABLE A.2 
Variable definition and estimation sample means of selected variables (in percent), 2009. 
 
Variable Mean Definition 
Strike incidence  12 1/0 dummy: 1 if there has been a stoppage or strike in the establishment in the last 12 months  
Workplace representation:   
Union only 35 1/0 dummy: 1 if the union is the single formal ER body present at the workplace 
Works council only 31 1/0 dummy: 1 if the works council is the single formal ER body present at the workplace 
Both a union and a works council 34 1/0 dummy: 1 if both the union and the works council are present at the workplace 
Prevalent union  60 
1/0 dummy: 1 if there is either a unique union agency at the workplace or where the union agency can be adjudged 
more influential than the corresponding works council agency where both entities are present. 
Prevalent works council 40 
1/0 dummy; 1 if there is either a unique works council agency at the workplace or where the works council agency 
can be adjudged more influential than the corresponding union agency where both entities are present. 
Union organization:   
ER union density 65 Union density of the employee representation body. 
Establishment union density 53 Union density at the establishment  
Union-dominated union club 47 
1/0 dummy: 1 if a union or a prevalent union representation is present and the majority of representatives are trade 
union members 
Union-dominated works council 16 
1/0 dummy: 1 if a works council or a prevalent works council is present and the majority of representatives are trade 
union members 
Collective agreement:  
 
No collective agreement 14 Individual agreement (i.e. no collective agreement) 
Company level 34 Company level agreement 
Higher than company level 
45 
Higher than company level agreement 
Mixed level 7 Mixed-level agreement (i.e. company level and higher than company level). 
IR quality:   
General work climate: Workers’ representative view 
85 
(IR_quality_ER)1/0 dummy: 1 if the relationship between management and employee representation can best be 
described as hostile (disagree or strongly disagree)  
General work climate: Management view 80 (IR_quality_MM)1/0 dummy: 1 if the general work climate in the establishment is very good or good 
Dissonance:   
Deviation/Dissonance_1 13 1/0 dummy: 1 if IR_quality_MM = 1 and IR_quality_ER = 0 
Deviation/Dissonance_2 19 1/0 dummy: 1 if IR_quality_MM = 0 and IR_quality_ER = 1 
Deviation (reference category) 68 1/0 dummy: 1 if IR_quality_MM = 1 and IR_quality_ER = 1 
Changes in organization:   
Changes in the remuneration system 30 1/0 dummy: 1 if major changes in the remuneration system were introduced in the past three years. 
Changes in the work process  45 1/0 dummy: 1 if changes in the organization of the work process were introduced in the past three years. 
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Changes in the working time  26 1/0 dummy: 1 if changes in the working time arrangements were introduced in the past three years 
Restructuring measures 36 1/0 dummy: 1 if restructuring measures were introduced in the past three years. 
   
Single establishment 64 1/0 dummy: 1 if single independent company or organization 
Public sector 39 1/0 dummy: 1 if establishment belongs to the public sector  
Industry affiliation:  
 
Industry 33 Code CDE (Manufacturing and energy)  
Construction 6 Code F (Construction) 
Commerce and hospitality 
11 
Commerce and hospitality [code G (Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, and personal 
and household goods); and code H (Hotels and restaurants)] 
Transport and communication 4 Transport and communication [code I (Transport, storage and communication)] 
Financial services and real estate 
2 
Financial services and real estate [code J (Financial intermediation); and code K (Real estate, renting and business 
activities)] 
Other services 
44 
Other services [code L (Public administration and defense; compulsory social security), M (Education), N (Health 
and social work); and  code O (Other community, social and personal service activities)] 
Establishment size:   
10 to 49 employees  32   
50 to 249 employees  37  
More than 250 employees 31  
   
Number of observations 5,080  
Notes: The means are obtained for a sample of establishments in which all the selected ER and MM variables are present (i.e. non-missing). Using the specification in column 
(1) of Table 6, this yields a total of 5,080 establishments. 
 
51 
 
Appendix. Construction of the additional strike indicators 
The three alternative strike indicators are based on the new variables strike_ord, strike_N, and 
strike_dur. Each is presented in turn. 
The derivation of strike intensity (strike_ord)  
Note first that if the respondent reports just one instance of industrial action, then the one strike or 
stoppage for less than one day case can be distinguished from the one strike for one day or more 
case. This yields the new categorical variable strike_ord, defined as equal to 1 if (_a, _1); 2 if (_a, 
_2); and 0 if no strike at all is reported (i.e. if strike = 0). If, however, there is more than one 
instance of industrial action, then additional data manipulation is required as the count cannot be 
based on _3 or _4 events (i.e. non-strike/stoppage events). Again using the structure of the dataset, 
it is possible to uniquely distinguish the case of ‘more than one strike for less than one day’ from 
the ‘more than one strike for one day or more’ in situations where they are mutually exclusive 
events. These cases correspond to (_b, _1) and (_b, _2), respectively, so that strike_ord = 3 if (_b, 
_1) and strike_ord = 4 if (_b, _2), conditional on both ‘refusal to work overtime’ and ‘other 
actions’ not being observed at all. 
Given the procedures required to correctly code all required mutually exclusive events 
flagged by the categorical variable strike_ord in the 0 through 4 scale, some observations are lost 
in comparison with the strike variable. This is the cost of going beyond a simple measure of strike 
incidence.  Indeed, from a total of 768 cases in which the strike variable is equal to 1, strikes_ord 
produces a total of 494 observations, with 181 coded as 1, 195 as 2, 61 as 3, and 57 as 4. The raw 
number of observations in which there is no stoppage/strike is of course unchanged. 
Once strike_ord is coded, the second step amounts to generating some relevant ordering. 
Clearly, the ordering 0 < 1 < 2 < 3 < 4 is not valid as, for example, one strike for one month (coded 
as strike_ord = 2) would appear to dominate, say, three strikes of less than one day (coded as 
strike_ord = 3); while, similarly, two strikes of two days (coded as strike_ord = 4) are apparently 
dominated by, say, one strike of one week (coded as strike_ord = 2). In other words, any of the 
ordering 2 < 3, 2 < 4 can be reversed, and 3 < 4 can be reversed as well.   
Given the construction of strike_ord, it is nevertheless the case that the ordering 0 < 1 < all 
the rest (the rest being given by the amalgamation of categories 2, 3, and 4) can be implemented. 
Furthermore, the following orderings are also valid: 0 < 1 < 2 (categories 3 and 4 are dropped); 0 
< 1 < 3 (categories 2 and 4 are dropped); and 0 < 1 < 4 (categories 2 and 3 are dropped). These 
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orderings allow us to define our first indicator, the strike intensity measure, that is, Case 3 in Table 
6, with columns (1) through (4) denoting the four respective possibilities. 
The derivation of strike frequency (strike_N)  
Our second indicator flags the number of strike episodes. This is Case 2 in Table 9.In this case, we 
generate the variable, strike_N, defined as equal to 0 if no strikes (or strike = 0); 1 if there is one 
strike (amalgamating strikes of less than one day and strikes lasting one day or more); and 2 if 
there is more than one strike (again amalgamating the two possibilities). In this scenario, we have 
0 < 1 < 2, and we end up with 631 ‘non-zero’ observations, a larger number than in the previous 
strike_ord case as some of the cases in which (_b, _1) and (_b, _2) are both observed do not have 
to be dropped in this configuration. 
The derivation of strike duration (strike_dur)  
This is Case 1 in Table 9. The third alternative is to flag strikes of less than one day’s duration 
versus those strikes lasting one day or more, to obtain the variable strike_dur, set equal to 0 if 
strike = 0; 1 if strikes are of less than one day; and 2 if strikes are of one day or more. Again, we 
have 0 < 1 < 2, with no need to discard any of the raw 768 observations. 
  
